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Dreaming of What Might Be
Not so long ago, republicanism – as ideology, as discourse, as political and
social practice, as conceptual paradigm – was a staple of American history. “By
1990," according to Princeton’s Daniel Rodgers, republicanism had expanded far
beyond the climes of revolutionary-era debate where Bernard Bailyn and Gordon
Wood, Joyce Appleby and J.G.A. Pocock, had first uncovered its spoor. It had
become a dominant concept in nineteenth century history and was drumming on
the door of the twentieth. It “was everywhere" in American historiography, “and
organizing everything."1 This was particularly true in labor history, where, for
fifteen years beginning in the early 1980s, the idea that something called “labor
republicanism" had emerged during the course of the nineteenth century as a
mature expression of distinctively American working-class values and
anticapitalist ideology became the subject of furious and extended argument.2
Then, rather abruptly, republicanism’s balloon burst; some would say, because it
had been discovered by the legal academy.3 The crowd moved on. Speaking
comparatively, republicanism in general, labor republicanism in particular,
attracts little attention from today’s historians.
To pick up Alex Gourevitch’s From Slavery to the Cooperative
Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century is thus
in some respects to enter a warp in time. The book is a crowd of well-known (to
the cognoscenti) Victorian faces – Orestes Brownson, Langton Byllesby, George
Henry Evans, William Heighton, George McNeill, Terence Powderly, Thomas
Skidmore, Ira Steward, William H. Sylvis, and more; it is full of the
organizations they nurtured – the workingmen’s parties, newspapers, and city
central unions of the 1820s and 1830s, the National Reform Association of the
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1840s and 1850s, the National Labor Union (1866-74), The Iron Molders
International Union (established 1859), and above all, of course, the Noble and
Holy Order of the Knights of Labor (established 1869); and it is a roster of the
historians who, thirty years ago, debated labor republicanism’s meaning.4 It is,
of course, nice to meet all these old friends again, to be reminded of good works
once done. But, one must ask, to what end? This is a nasty question to ask of a
junior scholar’s first book. Still, this is a book full of the familiar. What does
Gourevitch bring to this crowded table, apart from an opportunity to reminisce? I
will offer two responses.
First, the question is unfair. Gourevitch is not a historian engaged in a
hopeful rake-over of very cold ashes. He is a political scientist participating in a
debate of decidedly current moment within his own corner of that discipline,
political theory. Generally sympathetic to present-day scholars and public
intellectuals who embrace a “neo-republican" critique of liberal political theory,
Gourevitch nevertheless finds neo-republicanism cramped and incomplete. Like
its exponents, he has turned to “the stream of history," but not for the purpose of
historical inquiry.5 Rather he seeks to mobilize information and examples
ignored by neo-republicans that, he believes, will not only complete their
critique of liberalism but also in the process alter it radically.
Neo-republicans criticize liberalism for its attempt to naturalize our
conception of liberty as freedom from the actuality of interference in the choices
we make – an identifiable intrusion or trespass that impedes or hinders an
agent’s exercise of free will.6 The canonical modern statement is Isaiah Berlin’s,
from 1958: “The essence of the notion of liberty, in both the ‘positive’ and the
‘negative’ senses, is the holding off of something or someone – of others who
trespass on my field or assert their authority over me … intruders and despots of
one kind or another."7 Neo-republicans argue for a broader conception of liberty
as freedom from domination: that is, not simply freedom from actual
interference, real or threatened, but also from dominion, the condition of “living
in dependence on the goodwill of [others]," with all the constraints on autonomy,
on self-action and self-realization, that dependence implies.8 Neo-republicans
trace the pedigree of their theory of liberty to the “Democratical Gentlemen"
who spoke out against Stuart tyranny in seventeenth century England and who
warred against it in the English Civil War, and to the Romans – Sallust, Livy,
and Tacitus – by whom they were inspired.9 Neo-republicans regret the
extinguishment of this broad conception of liberty from English political
discourse that began with Hobbes, continued during the court versus country
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol17/iss3/5
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battles of the eighteenth century, and climaxed in the nineteenth century’s
decisive turn to utilitarianism and empiricism. They argue that English political
discourse should be recognized to contain not one but two theories of liberty,
“rival and incommensurable," even though “in recent times we have generally
contrived to ignore one of them."10
For Gourevitch, the extinguishment of republican liberty from English
political discourse is in part a story of how it turned up in America, where, as
American historians who cut their teeth on Bailyn and Wood and Pocock will
know, it played a major role in the epoch of the Revolution and the founding of
the republic. The thread of connection was not cut, it migrated. But far more
important than this history for Gourevitch is what came after, for it is there – in
the nineteenth century – that history can be found to sustain not simply a
neo-republican critique of liberalism but a radical critique of neo-republicanism.
For all its critical attention to domination, neo-republicanism has a cramped
understanding of its expressions, notably in market relations.11 In particular
neo-republicans have no conception of structural domination – the domination
associated with asymmetries of power in the organization of economic activity.
It was precisely that understanding of domination that American labor
republicans developed over the course of the nineteenth century, an
understanding that Gourevitch now argues we should rescue for our own times
“as a contribution to our own ideas" (189).
Labor republicans’ appreciation of structural domination took time and
effort to crystallize. An early impediment was American republicanism’s fatal
association with the actuality of slavery – the paradox of white civic freedom
and relative equality founded on African slavery sheeted home by Edmund
Morgan.12 Early labor republicans addressed the philosophical problem of a
republic of slavery by counterposing an antebellum republic of free labor,
idealizing labor as a free-willed disposition of one’s self in which all could
engage. “The ideal was meant to resolve the tension between freedom and
equality in favor of a universalizable conception of economic independence"
(16). Yet the solution was but a temporary compromise, for the question quickly
arose, of course, whether a meaningful “independence" could survive “free"
labor’s growing association with wage work and all the restraints on self-action
that the wage-paying employer demanded of the recipient employee. Here lay a
crucial choice: laissez-faire republicans (Garrisonian abolitionists, for example)
argued that by definition no one freely contracting to work for a wage could be
considered a wage slave. “The wage-laborer controlled his labor the way any
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2015
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property-owner controlled his property" (17). Labor republicans answered that,
contract notwithstanding, wage labor was necessarily a slavish dependence –
subordination to the direction of another. At first it was a dependence to be
avoided, in nostalgic “agrarian" invocations of artisanal sufficiency, of
propertied free-will. But increasingly, particularly after the Civil War, wage
labor was recognized as a structural dependence to be answered and transcended
by collective action – self-organization and cooperation. “Only the cooperative
commonwealth, a condition in which all workers exercised joint ownership and
control over industrial enterprises, could offer everyone a condition of free
labor" (17). This, and a newly collectivist conception of civic identity self-taught
through solidaristic practices and institutions to which the ideal of the
cooperative commonwealth was allied, was labor republicanism’s answer to
structural domination. Here is the radical supplement to neo-republicanism that
Gourevitch believes American history can teach to present-day political theory.
The second answer to my “nasty question" does not (unlike the first) turn on
the excuse that Gourevitch is not a historian. Instead it takes his resort to history
at his word as a conscious attempt to render history a lively and transformative
influence in a current debate. Musing on Ira Steward’s observation, in 1873, that
“the laborer instinctively feels that something of slavery still remains, or that
something of freedom is yet come,"13 Gourevitch observes “once we reconstruct
the ideas of the labor republicans, we might come to see not just the force of
their words in their own time, but that something of freedom is yet to come for
us as well" (17). There is at first sight a certain wistful quality to that hope.14
These ideas? A means to freedom for us? Now? How can steam-age musings
about cooperative commonwealths possibly have purchase on the teeming
globalized corporate world of 2015? Yet in developing its account of liberalism
and neo-republicanism, and of labor republicanism, Gourevitch’s book stands as
an illustration precisely of how all political consciousness is constructed from
fragile, centuries-long threads of ideas. In these threads ideas come and go and
come again. They are only ever rendered “out of date," doomed to entrapment in
a particular past from which the present has departed, in teleological and
developmental accounts of human affairs and intellects.
One might think this state of affairs allows the political theorist-as-historian
(or the historian-as-political theorist) a certain complacency: the ideas are always
there, they are not going anywhere, they can be retrieved as and when
appropriate. “The truth will not run away from us" Gottfried Keller famously
observed.15 But this is to think as an academic might, undertaking academic
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research and publishing an academic’s book. In real life the obverse is the case.
“For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one of its
own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably."16 Gourevitch may appear
wistful. By dint of circumstance and career, he may even appear to be academic.
But there is an urgency to the constellation of present and past that he seeks to
create.
Sixty years ago Isaiah Berlin attempted politely but firmly to consign one
mode of liberty – the positive – to the dustbin of the past, while simultaneously
locking the other – the negative – to a parsimonious liberal definition: freedom
from actual restraint. The present day’s neo-republicans have been attempting to
undo Berlin’s parsimonious definition, but they have failed to address (or
perhaps, rather, they do not care to address) the broader limitations on the usage
of liberty he inscribed. In “Two Concepts of Liberty" Berlin was actually
engaged in a double move, the effect of which was not only to exalt a liberal
version of negative liberty but to undermine those who would mobilize political
ideas of liberty in the service of self-realization, who would countermand
substantive domination with collective action. Gourevitch’s attempt to
supplement neo-republican critique of Berlin’s liberalism with a new awareness
of structural domination serves a clear current purpose. Far from raking cold
historical ashes, by seizing hold of the labor republicanism of the nineteenth
century he has lent historical research new purpose in a current conjuncture that
demands attention to the past.
Christopher Tomlins is Professor of Law at University of California
Berkeley School of Law. His books include Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and
Civic Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580-1865 (2010); Law, Labor,
and Ideology in the Early American Republic (1993); and The State and the
Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America,
1880-1960 (1985). His current research examines the 1831 Nat Turner Slave
Rebellion, as well as the history of contemporary legal thought.
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